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Viewing cable 09STATE76155, S) FOLLOWING UP WITH CHINA ON CASES OF

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE76155**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE76155	2009-07-21 22:30	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988319.ece>

P 212230Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 076155

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2034
TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KSCA](#) [CH](#) [IR](#) [PK](#)

SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING UP WITH CHINA ON CASES OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN

REF: A. STATE 30007 (BEIJING TIANLIANXING SCIENTIFIC)
 1B. BEIJING 861 (BEIJING TIANLIANXING
 SCIENTIFIC/SUZHOU)
 1C. STATE 30001 (SUZHOU TESTING INSTRUMENT FACTORY)
 1D. STATE 25689 (DALIAN SUNNY INDUSTRIES/LIMMT)
 1E. BEIJING 728 (DALIAN SUNNY INDUSTRIES/LIMMT)
 1F. STATE 4104 (SHANGHAI YUANSAN INDUSTRY & TRADE
 COMPANY)
 1G. BEIJING 202 (SHANGHAI YUANSAN INDUSTRY & TRADE
 COMPANY)
 1H. 08 STATE 113768 (CPMIEC AND CAAA)
 1I. 08 BEIJING 4064 (CPMIEC AND CAAA)
 1J. 08 STATE 105597 (POLYTECHNOLOGIES INC.)

¶K. 08 BEIJING 3854 (POLYTECHNOLOGIES INC.)
¶L. 08 STATE 129610 (JFMMRI CNNMIEC BMIEC AND BAMTRI)
¶M. 08 BEIJING 4610 (JFMMRI CNNMIEC BMIEC AND BAMTRI)
¶N. STATE 4341 (SHENYANG HUALI ECONOMIC TRADING COMPANY)
¶O. BEIJING 201 (SHENYANG HUALI ECONOMIC TRADING COMPANY)
¶P. 08 STATE 29703 (HONG KONG MOST GROUP CO. LTD.)
¶Q. 08 BEIJING 1209 (HONG KONG MOST GROUP CO. LTD.)
¶R. 08 STATE 130673 (HONG KONG MOST GROUP CO. LTD.)
¶S. 08 BEIJING 4609 (HONG KONG MOST GROUP CO. LTD.)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 3.

¶2. (S) Since March 2008, the U.S. has provided Chinese officials with information regarding a number of cases of missile-related proliferation concern (Refs). In the cases described below, we have received little or no response from China on the status of its investigations or on steps it is taking to address the concerns we have outlined. We therefore want to follow-up with Chinese authorities and request an update on these cases at the earliest possible time.

¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

--Over the past year as well as in the context of our nonproliferation dialogue, we have raised numerous cases of proliferation concern involving Chinese entities. However, we remain concerned as we have not received any substantive response from you on your efforts to investigate these activities.

--We therefore request an update on the status of your investigations or on the steps you have taken to address our concerns in the following cases.

¶A. Beijing Tianlianxing Scientific Ltd.

-- In March 2009, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that China's Beijing Tianlianxing Scientific Ltd. had offered 1,000 kilograms of specialty steel to Pakistan's Aginel Enterprises, an entity associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile programs.

--Though not controlled, we noted that this steel has been used to produce components in Pakistan's Ghaznavi short-range ballistic missile, a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I system.

¶B. Suzhou Testing Instrument Factory

-- In March 2009, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that Pakistan's Intralink Incorporated had sought a quote from the Chinese firm Suzhou Testing Instrument Factory for a vibration test system. Intralink Incorporated appears to be closely associated with the Project Management Organization (PMO), the developer of Pakistan's Ghaznavi short-range ballistic missile.

--As we indicated in our March 2009 demarche, this vibration test system is likely controlled by the MTCR and can be used to simulate the flight vibrations and shocks that rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) experience during launch, stage separation, and normal flight.

1C. Dalian Sunny Industries/LIMMT

-- In March 2009, the U.S. reiterated its long-standing serious concerns regarding the proliferation-related trading activities of the Chinese firm Dalian Sunny Industries.

-- As you are aware, for several years we have provided your government information related to Dalian Sunny Industries' supply of components and materials to entities and front companies associated with Iran's ballistic missile programs. In June 2008, the MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department provided no new information on actions taken against LIMMT, stating only that investigations were "ongoing" and asserting that LIMMT no longer existed as a business entity.

1D. Shanghai Yuanshan Industry and Trade Company

-- In January 2009, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that the Syrian entity Industrial Solutions ordered a consignment of 2024-T6 aluminum from the Chinese company Shanghai Yuanshan Industry and Trade Company.

--Industrial Solutions is a cover for the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the entity responsible for overseeing Syria's ballistic missile program.

--2024-T6 aluminum can be used to produce structural components in ballistic missiles and in some forms is controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.

1E. China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA)

-- In October 2008, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that the China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA) had concluded a contract to supply the Pakistani government with a trisonic wind tunnel.

-- We believe Pakistan may intend to use this wind tunnel, which is controlled by the MTCR, to support missile-related research and development in Pakistan.

1F. Polytechnologies Inc.

-- In October 2008, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that the Chinese firm Polytechnologies Inc. had concluded contracts - and used false documentation - to supply a coil winding machine and integrated optical chips to Pakistan's Advanced Engineering and Research Organization (AERO).

-- AERO is a procurement agent and alias for Pakistan's Air Weapons Complex (AWC), which has participated in Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons delivery systems, cruise missiles, and UAVs.

--We believe this equipment will likely be used by AERO to support missile-related projects in Pakistan.

1G. JFMMRI Metal Forming Machinery Engineering Company, Ltd. (JFMMRI), China National Nonferrous Metals Import Export Company (CNNMIEC), Beijing Machinery Import-Export Corporation (BMIEC), and Beijing Aeronautical Manufacturing Technology Research Institute (BAMTRI) Technology and Development Company.

-- Since 2006, the U.S. has raised with China our concerns regarding attempts by Pakistan's missile program to procure ring-rolling and flow forming machines from entities in China.

--These machines may ultimately be destined for Pakistan's

National Development Complex (NDC), which is responsible for developing Pakistan's Shaheen series of ballistic missiles.

--In December 2008, we requested an update on activities related to this case, and have not received any response.

H. Shenyang Huali Economic Trading Company

-- In April 2008, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that China-based firm Shenyang Huali Economic Trading Company, working through North Korean intermediaries, was acting as a key source of raw materials and technology for a North Korean ballistic missile development project in Syria.

--In January 2009, we followed up with additional information related to this case.

I. Hong Kong Most Group Co. Ltd.

-- On 24 March 2008, the U.S. raised with you our concerns that the Hong Kong Most Group Co. Ltd. finalized a sales contract to supply the Iranian firm Aluminat Co. with Chinese-origin aluminum plates that can be used to produce a variety of structural components in Scud missiles.

--The specific aluminum being supplied by Hong Kong Most Group to Iran is controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement. We provided further information to Chinese officials regarding this case in December 2008.

--We appreciate your interest in advancing our mutual nonproliferation goals and look forward to hearing your responses regarding these proliferation cases at the earliest possible time.

End talking points/non-paper

15. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Mike Kennedy (Phone: 202-647-3176). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.

16. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON

NNNN

End Cable Text

=====CABLE ENDS=====